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Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is, at face value, a critique of  parental neglect. 
After Victor Frankenstein succeeds in “discovering the cause of  generation 
and life; nay, more … [becomes] capable of  bestowing animation upon lifeless 
matter,” he abandons his creation.1 In language evoking both sexual experience 
and childbirth, he initially describes how “the astonishment which I had at first 
experienced on this discovery soon gave place to delight and rapture. After so 
much time spent in painful labor, to arrive at once at the summit of  my desires, 
was the most gratifying consummation of  my toils.”2 Piecing together a “human 
frame” out of  parts gleaned in “charnel houses,” “the dissecting room and the 
slaughter-house,” he creates a living being.3 The moment it breathes and moves, 
however, Victor views its creation as a “catastrophe.” “[B]reathless horror and 
disgust filled my heart,” he recounts.4 Victor abandons the monster and in doing 
so sets off  a chain of  events leading to the death of  himself  and everyone he 
cares about. As Shelley’s novel traces the monster’s sentimental (mis)education 
through both Victor’s telling and the monster’s own narrative, readers see the 
monster shift from sympathetic identification with humanity to outraged desire 
for vengeance against the parent who neglected to attend with sufficient care 
to his formation, physical and moral. 
Frankenstein was not Shelley’s only critique of  parental neglect. In her 
biographical essay on Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Lives of  the Most Eminent French 
Writers, she condemned Rousseau’s abandonment of  his and Therese le Vasseur’s 
children to a foundling hospital. Shelley judges this action “criminal”: “Five of  
his children were thus sent to a receptacle where few survive; and those who 
do go through life are brutified by their situation or depressed by the burden, 
ever weighing at the heart, that they have not inherited the commonest right of  
humanity, a parent’s care.”5 Shelley notes the distance Rousseau kept between 
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himself  and Therese (comparable to Victor’s from his fiancée Elizabeth during 
his act of  creation), and his persistence in believing he did right. Like Victor, who 
brings the monster to life with no plan for taking care of  it and then maintains, 
even in the face of  evidence to the contrary, that the monster could never have 
been well-raised anyway, Rousseau “first acted, he says, without serious exam-
ination of  the morality of  his conduct; but when he commenced author, he 
gave attentive consideration to the point and satisfied himself  that he did right.”6 
Herself  conceived by unmarried writers, Shelley had grounds for taking 
affront.  Her parents, William Godwin and Mary Wollestonecraft, had dropped 
their infamous opposition to marriage once Wollestonecraft became pregnant, 
wedding for the baby’s sake. The infant Mary Godwin was still unable to inherit 
her mother’s care, as Wollestonecraft died of  childbed fever ten days after giving 
birth. Raised by Godwin, she felt abandoned by him in childhood when he took 
a second wife (with whom Mary never got along) and then again when he refused 
to see her after she and Percy Bysshe Shelley took him at his (earlier) word on 
free love and eloped. Inheritor of  her parents’ insight that marital conventions 
entailed women’s oppression for the sake of  a small measure of  protection, 
she was a staunch defender throughout her life of  women left alone to care for 
dependents.7 Her perspective as Percy Shelley’s wife gave her additional grounds 
to condemn Rousseau’s fecklessness. “Like Frankenstein,” as literary scholar 
Barbara Johnson wryly notes, “Percy was known for his unreliable chemistry 
experiments, and for his disregard for the life around him.”8 
Yet for all the correlations with her own tragic story of  dead mother 
and dead babies (three of  the Shelleys’ four children died in early childhood, 
the first—whom Mary had not wanted—a year before Mary started writing this 
novel), Frankenstein is not autobiographical in any simple sense. And, as with the 
monster, it would be a grave mistake to take it at face value. Frankenstein is as much 
a critique of  parental involvement—or, more precisely, of  philosophical texts that 
engendered ideological prescriptions for 19th century mothers and that serve as 
important progenitors of  contemporary parental involvement discourse—as of  
parental neglect.9 Of  those philosophical texts, the most influential, and Shelley’s 
main target, is Rousseau’s Emile. At the heart of  the novel, the monster tells 
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the story of  his education by a family, the De Lacys, that replicates Rousseau’s 
description of  the household Emile and Sophie will set up to educate the next 
generation. The monster watches and listens from a shelter as Felix (“happy”) 
De Lacy and his sister Agatha (“good”) tend their cottage and care for their blind 
father, welcome Felix’s beloved—an “Arabian” girl named Safie—and teach Safie 
to speak and read their language. His learning initially progresses more or less 
as Rousseau theorizes in Emile.10 When the monster decides to reveal himself  
to the De Lacys in the hope of  winning their friendship, however, they turn on 
him violently because of  his appearance. For the disheartened monster, this 
is the point where feelings of  “rage and revenge” wipe out his sympathy with 
humanity.11 Shelley’s novel thus challenges Emile’s promise to create, through 
parental education done right, future generations of  men who are happy and 
good, or so this article argues. Shelley’s challenge to Emile’s premises extends 
beyond the pages about the De Lacys. Tracing connections between two pieces 
of  Shelley’s writing, Frankenstein and her biographical essay on Rousseau, and 
three of  Rousseau’s, the Confessions, La Nouvelle Heloise, and Emile, with a nod 
to Mary Wollestonecraft’s Vindication of  the Rights of  Women, this article reads 
Frankenstein as a young mother’s rebuttal of  discourse on motherhood that she 
correctly read as patriarchal, punitive, and silencing. In our current era of  poli-
cy-makers and pundits enamored with telling mothers (and, increasingly, fathers) 
why their children’s miseducations are their parents’ fault, Shelley’s recognition 
that model parents are a monstrous fantasy is refreshingly respectful of  the 
complexity of  parent/child relations.   
I BECAME THE MAN WHOSE LIFE I READ
Written as a frame narrative, Frankenstein contains three nested first-per-
son narratives. The monster’s story is framed by Victor’s, whose story is framed 
by the explorer Walton’s letters to his sister Margaret Walton Saville, telling her 
of  his encounter with Victor and the monster en route to the North Pole. The 
introduction, by another MWS, frames the whole. Actually, two introductions 
frame it, as the original 1818 introduction, written by Percy in Mary Wollestone-
craft Shelley’s name, was supplemented in the 1831 edition with a new intro-
67Amy Shuffelton
P H I L O S O P H Y   O F   E D U C A T I O N   2 0 1 8
duction, by Mary, that told the famous story of  her conception of  the novel 
in response to a ghost-story writing challenge posed by Percy and Lord Byron 
in the rainy summer of  1816. Both introductions contain a disavowal of  her 
literary offspring. In the 1818 introduction, Percy has her offer this disclaimer: 
“The opinions which naturally spring from the character and situation of  the 
hero are by no means to be conceived as existing always in my own conviction; 
nor is any inference justly to be drawn from the following pages as prejudic-
ing any philosophical doctrine of  whatever kind.”12 The novel was originally 
published anonymously, and reviewers, who assumed that it was written by a 
man, criticized the novel’s perceived failure to moralize about the blasphemy 
of  Victor’s actions. The revelation of  its author as female only intensified that 
critique.13 In the 1831 introduction, Mary explains that she is willing to share 
the story of  how the tale was conceived because “I shall thus give a general 
answer to the question so very frequently asked me—how I, then a young girl, 
came to think of  and to dilate upon so very hideous an idea.”14 As her language 
suggests, books are akin to children, their creation a kind of  childbirth, and 
both are understood to be reflections of  their parents.
Johnson’s “My Monster/My Self ” interprets the monster as a “figure” 
for the monstrosity of  autobiography. While all publication is a kind of  self-as-
sertion, there is something especially narcissistic about autobiography, which 
attempts to reflect the self  back to itself  and replicate this self-image. As Judith 
Butler comments, to call the monster a figure “names the predicament” inherent 
in forming a self  through writing one’s life story: 
disrupting that narcissistic project and exposing that im-
possibility; it signifies precisely that dimension of  the self  
one cannot bear to see at the same time that it absorbs and 
enacts the insuperable conflict of  the autobiographical 
project itself.  … The monster does not merely reflect back 
the author [Shelley] or the character [Victor] but refuses to 
do so, running off  in various directions, unmasterable and 
destructive.15  
The Monstrosity of  Parental Involvement: Formation through Reading in Shelley and Rousseau68
P H I L O S O P H Y   O F   E D U C A T I O N   2 0 1 8
For women, Johnson writes, autobiographical writing has been doubly prob-
lematic: 
since the very notion of  a self, the very shape of  human 
life stories, has always, from Saint Augustine to Freud, been 
modeled on the man. Rousseau’s—or any man’s—autobiog-
raphy consists in the story of  the difficulty of  conforming 
to the standard of  what a man should be. The problem for 
the female autobiographer is, on the one hand, to resist the 
pressure of  masculine autobiography as the only literary genre 
available for her enterprise, and, on the other, to describe a 
difficulty in conforming to a feminine ideal which is largely 
a fantasy for the masculine, not the feminine, imagination.16  
Johnson’s scholarship opened doors to interpreting Frankenstein as commentary 
on the perils to women of  forming a self  through writing. Here, I explore Fran-
kenstein as, also, commentary on the potential deformation of  women’s selves 
through reading. Insofar as male characters offer all the first-person accounts 
of  reading in Frankenstein, it is not immediately obvious why reading should be 
treated as particularly dangerous to women.  At the end of  the telescoped narra-
tives of  miseducative reading, however, the monster’s story alludes to Rousseau’s 
most gender-fantastical texts, which portray a monstrous masculine fantasy of  
a feminine ideal to a feminized readership.
The question of  what a man should be is at the forefront of  Shelley’s 
biographical essay on Rousseau. Written in an era when historical accounts of  
great men were considered an important mode of  moral education, “Rous-
seau” begins with a character assessment. Shelley credits him with what she 
says, “in ordinary men … would be named egotism or vanity” but in “men 
of  imagination, and eloquence, and mental energy” amounts to a “lively and 
intimate apprehension of  their own individuality, sensations and beings, which 
appears to be one of  the elements of  that order of  minds which feel impelled 
to express their thoughts and disseminate their views and opinions through the 
medium of  writing.”17 This is a paradox worthy of  Rousseau: what in ordinary 
men would be egotism is not egotism in men so egotistical they feel justified 
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in disseminating that ego. Given Shelley’s sophistication as a reader and writer, 
this paradox should be treated like Rousseau’s paradoxes, as a red flag, a warning 
to attend closely to forthcoming literary sleight-of-hand.
After a scant paragraph about Rousseau’s birth in Geneva, his mother’s 
death following childbirth, and his early upbringing by his father, Shelley’s essay 
turns to another early influence: his reading material. The prominence she gives 
his account of  this, juxtaposed with the preceding paradox, advises readers that 
to know what to make of  Rousseau’s writing, we need to know what to make 
of  his reading. In an essay that generally narrates more than it quotes, Shelley 
includes an extended quotation from Rousseau’s Confessions about Plutarch’s Lives, 
which he read in childhood. Rousseau himself  credits Plutarch with forming 
his character. It “cured me somewhat of  my love for romances,” he says, and 
“formed that independent and republican spirit, that proud untamable charac-
ter, impatient of  yoke and servitude.”18 In turning from romances, i.e. novels, 
associated then as now with femininity, to Plutarch’s Lives, Rousseau became 
a man as well as a citizen. “I became,” he says, “the man whose life I read.”19
Whether encountered in the original Confessions or in a book whose 
title—Lives of  the Most Eminent French Writers—echoes Plutarch’s, this statement 
is another red flag. Suppose that, as Rousseau claims, the reader of  an account 
of  an eminent man’s life indeed becomes the man whose life he reads. Or, as 
the reader of  a book titled Lives, becomes successive men, as one man’s life story 
yields to the next. As readers of  the life of  Rousseau, what sort of  man are we 
apt to become? Should we really run the risk of  reading the life of  this man, 
who generates lives only to abandon them? 
Frankenstein includes several cautionary tales about the effects of  reading 
on a child’s formation. The most fraught is Victor’s. “Natural philosophy is the 
genius that has regulated my fate,” Victor tells the explorer Walton. “I desire 
therefore, in this narration, to state those facts which led to my predilection for 
that science.” 20When he was thirteen, on a family vacation to the spa-town of  
Thonon, inclement weather kept him inside and he “chanced to find a volume 
of  the works of  Cornelius Agrippa,” a Renaissance philosopher fascinated by 
the occult.21 Upon reading Agrippa’s works, says Victor, “A new light seemed to 
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dawn upon my mind; and, bounding with joy, I communicated my discoveries 
to my father.”22 
In Victor’s account, his father’s reaction was a turning point in his ed-
ucation. “I cannot help remarking here,” Victor says, “the many opportunities 
instructors possess of  directing the attention of  their pupils to useful knowledge, 
which they utterly neglect.  My father looked carelessly at the title-page of  my 
book, and said ‘Ah! Cornelius Agrippa! My dear Victor, do not waste your time 
upon this; it is sad trash.”23 In lieu of  this brief  warning, Victor says, his father 
might have “taken the pains to explain to me that the principles of  Agrippa had 
been entirely exploded, and that a modern system of  science had been introduced, 
which possessed much greater powers than the ancient, because the powers of  
the latter were chimerical, while those of  the former were real and practical.”24 
Had his father redirected his interests, “it is even possible that the train of  my 
ideas would never have received the fatal impulse that led to my ruin.”25
Contrasting lessons can be drawn from this story about how childhood 
reading forms the man. In the straightforward interpretation, reading unchecked 
by parental influence can deform a child, insofar as it draws him into flights of  
imagination whose outcomes are as uncontrollable as the monster. Walton’s tale 
of  his childhood reading, which turned his imagination to nautical explorations, 
can also be explained this way.  “This expedition has been the favorite dream 
of  my early years,” he says. “I have read with ardor the accounts of  the various 
voyages which have been made in the prospect of  arriving at the North Pacific 
Ocean through the seas which surround the pole.”26 As in Victor’s story, parental 
inattention is held responsible for miseducation. “My education was neglected,” 
says Walton, “yet I was passionately fond of  reading. These volumes were my 
study day and night.”27 
Yet there is something unbalanced about Victor’s criticism of  his father, 
Alphonse, as literary scholar William Veeder points out. “Victor is correct,” 
Veeder says, “Alphonse should explain, not simply dismiss. But just as unques-
tionably, the magnitude of  Alphonse’s failure is relevant too. … What parent has 
not missed by at least this much the proper tone in a random moment?”28 Or, 
perhaps Veeder concedes too much to Victor, as surely Alphonse has no obli-
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gation to use his son’s every choice of  reading material as an opportunity for a 
lecture. Who would really want to be, or live with, a parent who did that? The 
real problem is not the reading material but the grown-up child’s misguided belief  
that his parent had an obligation to frame that material for him.  The missed 
lesson exemplifies not parental neglect but the unreasonableness of  holding 
parents responsible for every dimension of  a child’s experience. The absurdity 
of  Victor’s expectation of  his father, in the context of  his self-absolution from 
responsibility for his actions, suggests that expectations of  parental involvement, 
taken too far, deform the child’s ability to develop his own judgment and sense 
of  responsibility.
Like the other two narrators, the monster also has a story of  how he 
became the man whose life he read. The monster encounters three sets of  
texts, each of  which contributes to his education. He learns to read by over-
hearing Felix read aloud to Safie from Volney’s Ruins of  Empires. In contrast 
to Alphonse, Felix is a diligent interpreter.  “I should not have understood the 
purport of  this book,” says the monster, “had not Felix, in reading it, given 
very minute explanations.”29 The effect, however, is no more beneficial to the 
monster than Alphonse’s non-explanation to Victor, as the text inspires “strange 
feelings” in the monster.30 “Was man, indeed, at once so powerful, so virtuous, 
and magnificent,” he begins to wonder, “yet so vicious and base?”31 As reading 
Agrippa was for Victor, listening to Felix’s minute explanations of  Volney is 
an epiphany for the monster. “For a long time I could not conceive how one 
man could go forth to murder his fellows, or even why there were laws and 
governments,” he reports, “but when I heard details of  vice and bloodshed, my 
wonder ceased, and I turned away with disgust and loathing.”32 An experience 
of  reading (via interpretive read-aloud) awakens the monster to the knowledge 
of  good and evil and evokes his first impulse to murder. Through reading, he 
becomes Adam, but also Cain. Though Felix is not the monster’s parent, he 
serves as the monster’s tutor, in loco parentis, Jean-Jacques to the monster as to 
orphaned Emile. Parental influence, the monster’s education demonstrates, can 
have unintended effects as disastrous as parental neglect.
Furthermore, says the monster, “The words induced me to turn to-
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wards myself.”33 In the light of  what he has learned about humankind’s respect 
for power and wealth, which he contrasts with his own humble situation, the 
monster asks for the first time, “Was I then a monster?”34 With these questions 
in mind, the monster turns to a second set of  reading material, three books he 
finds in a lost “leathern portmanteau”: The Sorrows of  Young Werther, Paradise Lost, 
and Plutarch’s Lives.35 There are connections between Frankenstein and each of  
these books, most obviously with Paradise Lost, a quote from which serves as the 
epigraph to the novel. The set’s inclusion of  Plutarch’s Lives, whose significance 
is less obvious, gestures to Rousseau, or so I argue in this article’s conclusion. 
Throughout Frankenstein, men become the men in books they read—
alchemists, explorers, murderers. Rousseau says he became the men in Plutarch. 
By reading Plutarch, does the monster therefore become the same men Rousseau 
became? And, by the logic that if  A=C and B=C then A=B, does this imply that 
the monster is, in some sense, Rousseau? He is also, of  course, in another sense 
Young Werther, and the rebel angel, and the murderer of  empire-builders, but 
there can be no uniform reading of  this polysemous text. So he is not exactly 
Rousseau, but the connection has significance.  Retooling Johnson’s insight that 
the monster serves as a “figure” for problems of  textual representation rather 
than as an allegory for any particular person, we might describe the monster as 
a “figure” for the potentially monstrous effects of  texts, especially Rousseau’s 
texts, on readers.  
FORESIGHTED MOTHERS
There is one more reader to consider, the one who frames Rousseau’s 
life in her biographical essay by emphasizing his formation as a man through 
reading. What sort of  man has that reader become? No man at all, of  course. 
Rather, in Frankenstein as well as in that essay, Shelley tells readers why not to 
become the men—or women—whose lives we read. Like Mary Wollestonecraft’s 
Vindication of  the Rights of  Women, Frankenstein challenges Rousseau’s fantasy of  
woman as self-abnegating mother, personified in Emile by Sophie, who lives 
through Emile and their children, and in Rousseau’s novel La Nouvelle Heloise by 
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Julie, who does Sophie one better by dying happy after jumping into Lac Lemann 
to save her drowning child. Become that woman, Rousseau suggests. What a 
monstrous idea!, retort Wollestonecraft and Shelley. Shelley’s critique builds 
upon Wollestonecraft’s, insofar as Shelley challenges Rousseau’s retrogressive 
conception of  femininity but also the entire conceit of  discursively constructing 
idealized parents for readers to model themselves after.
To know what to make of  Shelley’s writing, we need to know what 
to make of  her reading. When she wrote Frankenstein, Shelley had recently read 
Rousseau’s Confessions and Emile, texts in which Rousseau establishes himself  as 
writer-of-lives par excellence.36 Emile is not usually considered autobiographical, 
though scholars have assigned it to a range of  genres. It has been called a novel 
and a philosophical essay, and, because 18th century readers understood it to be 
offering advice on raising children, it also engendered the modern child-rearing 
manual, whether or not Rousseau meant it to.  In an origin-story of  Emile and 
Emile, character and book, Rousseau provides grounds for reading it as a hybrid 
of  all these. “Someone of  whom I know only the rank had the proposal to 
raise his son conveyed to me,” Rousseau tells us.37 He refused, he says, because 
“I feel my incapacity too much ever to accept such employment.  … Not in a 
condition to fulfill the most useful task, I will dare at least to attempt the easier 
one; following the example of  so many others, I shall put my hand not to the 
work but to the pen.”38  Then follows another paradox: because he is incapable 
of  raising a child, Rousseau will explain how to raise a child:
I have hence chosen to give myself  an imaginary pupil, to 
hypothesize that I have the age, health, kinds of  knowledge, 
and all the talent suitable for working at his education, for 
conducting him from the moment of  his birth up to the one 
when, become a grown man, he will no longer have need of  
any guide other than himself.39  
This book, in other words, will imagine Jean-Jacques to be not the man he is, the 
man who eventually confesses to abandoning his five children, but an idealized 
father figure.  It functions as a sort of  fantasy autobiography, in which Rousseau 
becomes the imaginary parent whose life he writes.40
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Yet the addressee of  Emile can no more become the educator Jean-
Jacques than can Rousseau. In the Preface’s first line, Rousseau tells the reader 
that “This collection of  reflections and observations … was begun to gratify 
a good mother who knows how to think.”41 In the third paragraph of  Book I, 
he expands the audience to all mothers, addressing and defining the reader as 
follows: “It is to you that I address myself, tender and foresighted mother, who 
are capable of  keeping the nascent shrub away from the highway and securing 
it from the impact of  human opinions.”42 Emile is addressed to women; if  you 
the reader happen to be a man, this romance of  a text puts you into a feminized 
subject position. Continuing in the second-person, Rousseau tells mothers to 
“Form an enclosure around your child’s soul at an early date. Someone else 
can draw its circumference, but you alone must build that fence.”43 With this, 
Rousseau begins a book that sets higher expectations than any real parent could 
possibly meet. The ideal parent is to withdraw from society for 18 years in order 
to control all influences on the child. Or, at least, that is the situation that faces 
the tutor—and, eventually, Sophie, who takes his place of  total responsibility in 
the next generation. In Emile’s model of  the ideal mother, her soul is also to be 
enclosed, tucked away like the monster in his shelter at the DeLacy’s. The adult 
Emile does engage in other labor, giving him some leave from child-raising, 
but Sophie, given the excessive requirements of  foresight, can only submerge 
herself  in motherhood (presumably, excepting short breaks to attend to her 
appearance and flirt with Emile).
Rousseau’s catastrophic ideal is with us still, running off  in all directions. 
Contemporary idealizations of  parental involvement, which are embedded in 
policy directives and worked into the common sense notion that “it all comes 
down to the parents,” continue to hold parents responsible to an impossibly 
high degree for their children’s futures. This appears to have intensified in re-
cent decades. As Shelley forecast with Victor’s condemnation of  his father, the 
idea that parents should constantly engage with children’s needs and interests 
has become a measure for judging fathers as well as mothers. Yet parents are 
no more able than ever to control the effects of  reading material, other media, 
social encounters, and other environmental factors on their children, who fur-
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thermore have unpredictable interests, talents, and reactions. 
“Our first duty,” Shelley comments in her account of  Rousseau’s 
“short-sighted” decision to abandon his children, “is to render those to whom 
we give birth wise, virtuous and happy, as far as in us lies.”44 Frankenstein gives 
shape to what that caveat “as far as in us lies” entails. It recognizes the para-
mount importance of  the parent-child relationship to the child’s education, but 
it also recognizes its limitations. So long as Rousseau’s ideal of  self-abnegating 
parenthood continues to haunt us, as it does, Shelley’s critique of  his suggestion 
that one person’s life-story can be collapsed into another’s—reader’s into writer’s, 
parent’s into child’s—remains radical and revelatory. Her novel demonstrates 
limitations inherent in parents’ education of  their children and the catastrophic 
effects of  denying those limitations, effects that the theorists, technocrats, and 
promoters of  parental involvement are, like Victor Frankenstein facing his 
monster, loathe to accept.
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